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Response Quality of the 110 Police Call Center in Gorontalo Regency, Indonesia: A Qualitative SERVQUAL Analysis

Rafsanjani Yusuf *, Ellys Rachman, Tety Thalib

Master of Administrative Science Program, Universitas Bina Taruna Gorontalo, Gorontalo, Indonesia
*Email (corresponding author): rafiyusuf47@gmail.com

Abstract. *The quality of a police call center depends on what happens after the line is answered. This study examined the response quality of the 110 Police Call Center at a district police command in Gorontalo Regency, Indonesia, and the factors that hinder it. A descriptive qualitative design used the five SERVQUAL dimensions as an interpretive frame, not a scoring instrument. Data came from semi-structured interviews with nine purposively selected informants (three call operators, one senior operations officer, one field duty officer, and four citizens who had used the service), one observation session, and service records. Analysis followed Miles et al. (2020), with source and technique triangulation. The front end of the service was strong: facilities were largely adequate, procedures were clear and supervised, calls were answered within about 1 to 5 seconds, and operators were courteous. In the unit's records, the share of operator-processed calls recorded as handled rose from 54.26% in 2025 (twelve months) to 98.96% in January to June 2026, although missed calls remained; these figures describe call reception, not dispatch or arrival. Informants reported arrival times of about 5 to about 30 minutes, longer at night, when duty personnel had to be assembled. Operators had no formal call-handling training, citizens hesitated to call for fear of identity exposure or call charges, and network disruption, prank calls, and distance added strain. Quality was stronger at call reception than at field follow-up. Four tentative propositions are offered: layered responsiveness, anticipatory assurance, accountability asymmetry, and standard procedures as a competence buffer. Findings come from one site and are not generalizable. By showing where an accessible emergency channel falls short after the call is answered, the study relates to SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions), particularly target 16.6 on effective and accountable institutions.*

Keywords: *Call Center 110; Police Service Quality; SERVQUAL; Responsiveness; Complaint Handling*

1. Introduction

An emergency call is often a citizen's first and only contact with the police at a moment of need, and the speed and manner of that contact matter beyond the incident itself. In a randomized trial in an English police force, callers who were connected at once to an officer by telephone were more often satisfied, and fewer of them reported a fall in trust, than callers who waited for a face-to-face visit (Rothwell et al., 2022). Among Indonesian millennials who had been served by the police, trust was positively related to willingness to cooperate with the police, and procedural justice strengthened that link (Anwar & Marta, 2023). A call center is therefore both a service channel and a point at which public trust is made or lost.

In Indonesia, the 110 service is governed by Police Regulation No. 1 of 2018 (Republik Indonesia, 2018). The regulation sets three operator tiers: Level 1 at the district police command (Polres), Level 2 at the provincial command (Polda), and Level 3 at national

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headquarters, with calls that a lower tier cannot take passing upward. A Level 1 operator verifies the caller, records the report, forwards it to the district's integrated police service center (SPKT), and monitors the follow-up.

Research on the service has looked at its implementation and effectiveness. The Bengkulu provincial police service was judged to be running well but still in need of better quality (Kristianto et al., 2023). In Bandung, implementation rested on a central command center, coordination among units, and standard operating procedures, and WhatsApp-based channels were described as building public trust (Wulandari, 2025). In Denpasar, the service was found not effective in handling traffic accidents because of internal and external inhibiting factors (Adithya & Pratiwi, 2026).

Service quality research supplies a vocabulary for such questions. SERVQUAL treats quality as the match between what users expect and what they perceive, organized in five dimensions: tangibles, reliability, responsiveness, assurance, and empathy (Parasuraman et al., 1988). Applied to police front desks in Indonesia, it has produced mixed pictures. At a central Jakarta police service center, responsiveness came closest to expectations and tangibles showed the widest gap (Olin et al., 2026). At a sub-district police station in Manado, responsiveness to complaints was rated good while timeliness was not yet maximal (Raha et al., 2024). Closer to the present setting, studies of the Gorontalo police point to limited public understanding of the service system and a gap between policy and practice (Mbiuwa et al., 2024), and to officer conduct as a key indicator of public service quality (Lahaling et al., 2023).

Two features of a call center sit awkwardly with this work. First, the unit that answers the telephone is rarely the unit that arrives at the scene, so what a caller experiences is the product of a chain of units rather than of one counter. Second, the caller judges the service twice, once when the line is answered and again when help arrives. Grönroos (1984) separates how a service is delivered from what the user finally receives, which offers a way to think about the two moments. In the studies we reviewed, these two moments were not examined separately for a district-level 110 unit.

The district police command studied here is a timely case. According to the unit's own account, the 110 service was introduced in the province in 2018, saw little use for several years, and was reactivated in 2025. Its internal records show that the share of answered calls that were handled rose from 54.26% in 2025 to 98.96% in the first half of 2026 (Table 1). Such figures describe call reception. They say little about what happens between the answer and the arrival of an officer, which is where, in the authors' preliminary observation, personnel had to be gathered from different duty units, no dedicated response team existed, and vehicle capacity limited how many officers could go.

This study therefore asks how the response quality of the 110 Police Call Center at this district police command appears across the five SERVQUAL dimensions, and which factors hinder it. Because the study is qualitative and based on one site, it also offers a small number of tentative propositions for later testing and does not claim generalizable findings.

The question also bears on Sustainable Development Goal 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions). Target 16.6 calls for effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels, and target 16.10 for public access to information. An emergency line that is easy to reach, answers quickly, and lets callers follow the progress of their reports is one everyday expression of these aims. This study does not measure progress toward SDG 16; it examines where, in one district, the institutional chain behind the 110 line meets or falls short of them.

2. Materials and Methods

2.1. Design and analytic frame

The study used a descriptive qualitative design, suited to understanding how a service is delivered and experienced by those who run it and use it (Creswell & Poth, 2018). SERVQUAL served as an interpretive frame for organizing evidence and not as a scoring instrument. Expectations were not measured, so statements about gaps between expectation and experience are interpretations of what informants said. For a service delivered by telephone, tangibles were read as the readiness of equipment, recording systems, and means of mobility, since callers do not see a counter.

2.2. Setting and informants

The study took place at the Call Center 110 unit of a district police command in Gorontalo Regency. The unit belongs to the Operations Division and is staffed by nine operators in three teams of three, each team working a 12-hour shift. Informants were selected purposively to include people who run the service and people who use it: operators, an officer responsible for the unit, a field duty officer, and citizens who had called the service during the previous six months, chosen to cover different kinds of report. Nine people were interviewed: three operators (O1 to O3, one from each team), one senior operations officer responsible for the unit (K1), one field duty officer (F1), and four citizens (C1 to C4) whose reports concerned suspected criminal activity, a late-night public-order disturbance, traffic congestion at a market, and a traffic accident. Their ages ranged from 20 to 46 years; eight were men and one was a woman. Internal informants were chosen by duty post and function, and citizens by type of complaint (crime, traffic, and public order). All four citizens had reached the service and received a follow-up; no caller who failed to get through or whose report was not followed up was interviewed. Their accounts are therefore likely to present responsiveness and assurance more favorably than the experience of all callers would, and the two slow arrivals they reported should be read as a lower bound on the problem rather than its full extent.

2.3. Data collection

Data came from three sources. Semi-structured interviews followed a guide covering the five dimensions and the obstacles informants perceived, and allowed follow-up questions. They were held in Indonesian between August and September 2026, in person or, in some cases, by telephone or messaging application, and were transcribed. One observation session of about nine hours, from 10:00 to 19:00 local time on a Monday (21 September 2026), covered call receipt, communication with callers, handoff to the duty officer, and the state of equipment and applications. Documents included the unit's call records for 2025 and January to June 2026, the call-answering guide used by operators, and Police Regulation No. 1 of 2018. Because the observation ended in the evening, conditions at midnight and on weekends were not observed directly; statements about those periods in this article rest on informants' accounts and are identified as such.

2.4. Analysis and trustworthiness

Analysis followed the interactive model of Miles et al. (2020), in which data condensation, display, and conclusion drawing proceed alongside data collection. Transcripts, field notes, and documents were first coded against the five SERVQUAL

dimensions. Obstacles were grouped under four sub-focus areas set at the outset (human resources, infrastructure, structure and coordination, and public participation) and refined with the data. Matrices were used to compare accounts of the same event across sources. Trustworthiness followed the criteria described by Nowell et al. (2017). Credibility was supported by source triangulation (operators, supervisor, field officer, citizens, and records) and technique triangulation (interviews, observation, and documents). Transferability is addressed by describing the setting in detail. Dependability and confirmability were supported by regular consultation with the academic supervisors, who reviewed the research process. Triangulation was applied claim by claim. Answering speed was compared across the observation, operators' accounts, and citizens' accounts. Follow-up time was compared across the one dispatch the researcher timed, the accounts of F1 and O2, and citizens' recollections; because only assembly and departure could be timed from the operator room, arrival times rest on accounts. Statements about training and equipment were checked between interviews and observation. Where accounts differed, the differences were kept and reported. Quotations were translated from Indonesian by the authors and shortened where needed; informants are identified only by codes.

2.5. Researcher position and ethics

The study was approved by the university as the first author's master's thesis research and was carried out with the required research permission. All informants received an explanation of the aims and procedures and gave written consent. Individual names, interview locations and dates, and incident details that could identify informants were removed or generalized, and internal documents were used for analysis only. Transcripts contain identifiable information and are not publicly available.

3. Results and Discussion

3.1. Service context and call records

The unit takes calls on IP telephones and works with three applications: one for recording and managing reports, one for real-time distribution of reports between the district and provincial commands, and a wallboard display linked to national headquarters. After answering, the operator verifies the caller's identity, location, and complaint, then passes a disposition sheet to the duty officer at the SPKT. Duty personnel from units such as traffic, criminal investigation, intelligence, and patrol act as first responders. The field team returns a follow-up report to the operator, who uploads it to the application and sends a recap to the Operations Division. There is no dedicated response team; responders are drawn from the duty rosters of several units. In this article, a call is *received* when it reaches the unit's line, *answered* when an operator picks it up, *handled* when the unit's records count it as handled, *dispatched* when the duty officer sends personnel, and followed by *arrival* when officers reach the scene.

Table 1 shows the unit's call records. The three outcome categories add up to the calls received in both periods (3,277 + 2,762 + 1,646 = 7,685 in 2025; 2,471 + 26 + 369 = 2,866 in January to June 2026). The handling rates the unit reports, 54.26% and 98.96%, are handled calls divided by calls that reached an operator, that is, handled plus not handled. They are not shares of all incoming calls. Measured against all incoming calls, the handled share rose from 42.6% to 86.2% and the missed share fell from 21.4% to 12.9%. Both readings point toward better call reception. The records do not define “not handled,” and we could not tell whether

the category includes prank or unintelligible calls. They also contain no arrival times. According to O2, each 12-hour shift recap lists the calls handled and not handled, with reasons, and notes prank calls; "handled" therefore refers to the processing of a call by the operator and does not show that officers were dispatched or reached the scene. Two further cautions apply. The 2025 figures cover twelve months, including the period in which the service was reactivated, and the 2026 figures cover six, so the periods are not directly comparable and only rates, not volumes, can be set side by side. And while "not handled" calls fell sharply, from 2,762 to 26, 369 calls (12.9% of incoming calls) were still missed in the first half of 2026.

Table 1. Call records of the 110 unit, January to December 2025 and January to June 2026 (number of calls and percentages).

Measure	2025 (Jan-Dec)	2026 (Jan-Jun)
Calls received	7,685	2,866
Missed calls	1,646	369
Handled calls	3,277	2,471
Not handled calls	2,762	26
Handled / (handled + not handled), as reported by the unit	54.26%	98.96%
Handled / calls received	42.6%	86.2%
Missed / calls received	21.4%	12.9%
Not handled / calls received	35.9%	0.9%

Source: Call Center 110 unit records, processed by the authors. Note. The unit's records do not define "handled" or "not handled"; both refer to call processing by operators, not to field response. The last three shares were calculated by the authors. The two periods differ in length (twelve and six months) and are not directly comparable.

Averaged over each period, the unit recorded about 21 calls a day in 2025 and about 16 a day in the first half of 2026 (our calculation). One operator (O3) described up to 20 to 50 calls in a 12-hour shift, of which only 3 to 5 were genuine reports. That figure is best read as a description of peak shifts, since it is well above the recorded average.

3.2. Tangibles

The observation found an air-conditioned operator room with CCTV and good lighting, three workstations with computers and headsets, a router, and a meeting room with a display for video meetings. Of the three IP telephones, two worked and one was out of order. Official vehicles from the SPKT, traffic, patrol, and duty-function units were available for follow-up. K1 and O3 each described the facilities as adequate; O3 said, "We are fairly well equipped here ... we are comfortable because the facilities are good." Neither mentioned the broken telephone, which only the observation revealed. The data do not show whether it went unreported by operators or unnoticed in routine checks.

For a voice service, the equipment that matters is what lets a call be heard, recorded, and passed on, and on that count the unit was well provided. Two cautions apply. A broken handset does not disable a unit with three lines, but it suggests that equipment may not be checked routinely, a point we did not ask about directly. And the equipment depends on a network that informants described as unreliable (Section 3.7). The contrast with the Jakarta

study, where tangibles showed the widest gap (Olin et al., 2026), should not be pushed far, because that study surveyed users of a public counter and this one interviewed users of a telephone line.

3.3. Reliability

Operators follow a call-answering guide: greeting, identity, address, and complaint, followed by transfer to the SPKT duty officer. Every call must be answered, including silent and prank calls, which the observation confirmed. O2 explained: "Whether it is a prank or not, we must still answer politely, following the guide. We cannot ignore it, because one unanswered call will be questioned by the leadership." Calls are logged automatically by the three applications, so, as O2 noted, call counts cannot be invented. At the end of each shift operators write a recap of calls received, handled, and not handled, with reasons, and send it through the application, a word-processing document, and a messaging application.

Supervision is tiered. According to K1, operators answer to the SPKT duty officer, who is supervised by the head of the operations control subdivision and then by the head of the Operations Division. Daily activity is reported online and offline, and a weekly video meeting evaluates operator performance from national headquarters down to the provincial and district levels.

These accounts describe reliability as procedural: the same steps, recorded the same way, and reviewed on a fixed cycle. That is reliability at the operator's desk. Whether the caller's problem is resolved depends on units that take over after the handoff, and no operator controls them. Wulandari (2025) likewise describes a central command center, inter-unit coordination, and standard procedures meant to keep service consistent, and Kristianto et al. (2023) judged the Bengkulu service to be running well while needing better quality. Both are consistent with a service that is procedurally sound at the front and open to improvement elsewhere.

3.4. Responsiveness

Responsiveness showed two different pictures, depending on whether the question was how fast a call was answered or how fast help arrived (Table 2). Calls were answered quickly. The observation recorded a wait of about one second, O2 gave 3 to 5 seconds, and three citizens (C1 to C3) described an answer at the first ring or after about 3 seconds. K1 stated that the working limit is 10 seconds, after which an unanswered call escalates to the next tier; he described this limit as conveyed by the National Police Chief (Kapolri), not written in regulation. C4 met this mechanism: the first attempt returned a busy signal, and the second, after 5 to 10 seconds, was answered by a headquarters-level operator who passed the call to the district unit.

Table 2. Answering and follow-up times by source: researcher observation and informants' estimates.

Source	Call answered	Follow-up time (dispatch or arrival)
Researcher observation (one call, about 19:00, weekday)	About 1 second	10 to 15 minutes to assemble and set out (dispatch); arrival not observed

Source	Call answered	Follow-up time (dispatch or arrival)
Operator O2	3 to 5 seconds	Arrival: 5 to 10 minutes usually; 20 to 30 minutes at midnight (reported, not observed)
Field officer F1	Not reported	Dispatch: 10 to 15 minutes waiting for other units to gather
Senior officer K1 (stated working limits, not measured times)	10 seconds, then escalation	10 minutes to reach the scene; conveyed as a directive from the National Police Chief, no written standard found
Citizen C1	About 3 seconds	Arrival: about 30 minutes (suspected crime); about 5 minutes (later noise complaint)
Citizen C2	About 3 seconds	Arrival: 10 to 15 minutes
Citizen C3	At the first ring	Arrival: 5 to 10 minutes (nearby sub-district post)
Citizen C4	Busy signal, then 5 to 10 seconds; headquarters-level operator	Arrival: about 30 minutes

Source: Interviews and observation, processed by the authors. Note. The observation row was timed by the researcher for one call at about 19:00 on Monday, 21 September 2026; it covers assembly and departure only, because arrival could not be seen from the operator room. All other times are informants' estimates. The K1 row reports stated working limits, not measured times.

Arrival was less even. F1 explained that duty personnel wait in their own unit rooms and are summoned one by one by the SPKT duty officer, and may wait for colleagues from other units when a report needs several officers, which takes 10 to 15 minutes. The one dispatch timed during the observation took a similar 10 to 15 minutes to assemble and set out; arrival at the scene was not observed. O2 described midnight, a period the observation did not cover, as the hardest: "At midnight, when personnel are changing shifts to rest, the response can take longer, around 20 to 30 minutes." As an example, O2 recalled a late-night noise complaint for which, after about 20 minutes, no duty-function personnel had assembled; the SPKT unit chief then asked the nearest sub-district post to attend, and its officers arrived about 30 minutes after the report. K1 acknowledged limited personnel and long distances to some locations.

Citizens' accounts varied with the case. C3 and C2 reported arrival in 5 to 15 minutes. C1 and C4 each reported about 30 minutes, and C1 remarked that the delay occurred although the house was close to the police office. C1 summed up the contrast: "I feel some calls get a quick response and some a slow one. Answering speed I think is excellent, but for a case like mine it is regrettable that it was handled slowly."

The two pictures can be read as two layers of responsiveness. Answering and manner fall on the side Grönroos (1984) calls how a service is delivered; the arrival of officers and the resolution of the problem are closer to what the user finally receives. The layers are produced by different units, the operators on one side and the SPKT and duty-function personnel on the

other, so a judgment based on the operator alone can flatter the service or blame the wrong people. The pattern resembles Raha et al. (2024), who found responsiveness good but timeliness not yet maximal at a police station. It also qualifies what speed can do. In the English trial, immediate telephone contact raised satisfaction, but those were medium-priority cases in which a telephone conversation replaced a visit (Rothwell et al., 2022). Callers to 110 mostly need someone to come, and for them a fast answer did not offset a slow arrival. Night work may compound the problem: in a review of qualitative research on ambulance call-takers, shift work and poorly managed rosters were sources of strain (Willis et al., 2020), and O2 described operators taking turns to sleep at night.

3.5. Assurance

Citizens C1 to C3 described operators as polite, calm, and soft-spoken, and C2 said the tone stayed good even when calling late at night. The observation agreed: operators greeted callers, explained what would happen, and calmed them. Competence was a weaker point. None of the operators had completed vocational police education or formal training in call handling, and none had a communication background. Preparation consisted of the answering guide and assistance from the provincial operations bureau, including a one-day session and an online session from headquarters attended by representatives only. Asked about a panicked caller, O1 said, “We might be a little confused, because honestly we do not have much experience yet and have not been trained to handle a situation like that.” O3 asked for training, and K1 saw room for improvement through training.

Trust was affected before any call began. C1 said: “At first I hesitated to call because I was afraid my identity would be spread around, afraid of being made a witness, even afraid of being summoned to the police office for questioning.” After the operator answered, C1 felt calm. F1 said field teams do not mention callers' names unless the case needs the reporter as a witness. K1 said reporters can follow the progress of a report by entering the report number on the national 110 website; no citizen mentioned it.

Assurance therefore had two unequal sides. Courtesy was strong and appeared to rest on the guide and on experience. Competence was fragile outside standard situations. Tracking and confidentiality arrangements existed, but they were not reaching the callers who needed them: the reassurance C1 needed was available only after the decision to call had been made. This echoes the finding that limited public understanding of the service system is an obstacle at the Gorontalo police (Mbiuwa et al., 2024), and the recommendation of a tracking facility for citizens' reports ADDIN ZOTERO_ITEM CSL_CITATION {"citationID":"zNytVymF","properties":{"unsorted":false,"formattedCitation":"(Lahaling et al., 2023)","plainCitation":"(Lahaling et al., 2023)","noteIndex":0},"citationItems":[{"id":946,"uris":["http://zotero.org/users/local/zIv4SGFe/items/9FZGX8ZG"],"itemData":{"id":946,"type":"article-journal","container-title":"Al-Daulah: Jurnal Hukum Pidana dan Ketatanegaraan","DOI":"10.24252/ad.vi.37229","issue":"1","page":"78–89","title":"Perspektif masyarakat terhadap perilaku oknum polisi mempengaruhi kualitas pelayanan publik di wilayah Kepolisian Daerah Gorontalo","volume":"12","author":[{"family":"Lahaling","given":"Hijrah"},{"family":"Makkulawuzar","given":"Kindom"},{"family":"Rahmawati","given":"Rahmawati"},{"family":"Nur","given":"Rafika"},{"family":"Darmawati","given":"Darmawati"},{"family":"Insani","given":"Nur"}],"issued":{"date-parts":[["2023"]]}}}],"schema":"https://github.com/citation-style-

language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"} (Lahaling et al., 2023)(Anwar & Marta, 2023)

3.6. Empathy

Operators asked for identity, location, and complaint in a calm manner and served callers at night. C2 and C3 felt helped: C2 had a problem that could not be solved alone and saw it resolved quickly, and C3 had not expected the police to act so quickly and valued that the call was free of charge. At the same time, C2 had hesitated because of a fear that the call would use up phone credit. C1 asked for faster responses to urgent matters, C2 suggested that the police publicize the service, and C3 hoped the police would become protectors and servants of the community. K1 hoped that the service would give people a sense of security and legal certainty and reduce crime.

Empathy was strong in the interaction. Access, however, was limited by what people understood about the service, including the fact that it is free. No informant reported being asked for payment, a concern that surfaced in the Gorontalo police study (Mbiuwa et al., 2024); the cost worry here was about call charges. Taken with the confidentiality concern in Section 3.5, it suggests that some of the empathy the service shows in conversation has to be conveyed beforehand.

3.7. Factors hindering response quality

Six obstacles emerged; Table 3 summarizes the evidence and interpretation for each SERVQUAL dimension. The first was network disruption. Operators O1 and O3 reported that telephone and internet connections falter, so that a call sometimes does not ring on the handset but appears in the application, voices cut out, and reporting through the application slows or fails. O2 said that when the application fails the report goes through the messaging application or a document. K1 regarded the problem as technical and outside the unit's control, and C4's busy signal fits this account. The second was limited training, described in Section 3.5. The third was the volume of prank and unclear calls. O3 estimated that most calls in a heavy shift were pranks or tests, and O2 said pranks were frequent. Operators must answer them all. No informant said that genuine reports were displaced, so the burden appears to be workload and attention rather than blocked lines.

The fourth was personnel, distance, and assembly time. Without a dedicated response team, officers come from the duty rosters of several units, each in its own room, and must be called one by one (F1). K1 added that personnel are sometimes limited by other duties and that some locations are far away. The fifth was equipment that was not fully serviceable, the broken IP telephone. The sixth was hesitation among the public, whether from fear of exposure (C1) or of call charges (C2). Three of these are internal to the police (training, assembly of personnel, equipment upkeep) and three are largely external (network, prank calls, public hesitation), with distance and terrain sitting between them. Adithya and Pratiwi (2026) also attribute the limited effectiveness of the Bali 110 service to both internal and external factors, which suggests that the mix is not specific to this unit.

Table 3. Interpretation of response quality by SERVQUAL dimension.

Dimension	Main evidence	Interpretation
Tangibles	Equipment and three monitoring applications available; one of three IP telephones out of order	Relatively strong; maintenance gap
Reliability	Answering guide; every call answered; automatic logging; tiered supervision with weekly evaluation	Strong in procedure; outcome depends on other units
Responsiveness	Answered in about 1 to 5 seconds (observed and reported); assembly 10 to 15 minutes (observed once); arrival about 5 to 15 minutes, 20 to 30 at night, and about 30 in two citizen accounts (reported)	Very good at reception; uneven at follow-up
Assurance	Courteous operators; no formal training; reporters hesitant over identity	Strong in manner; fragile in competence and in trust before contact
Empathy	Calm, attentive manner; night service; free service valued; worry about call charges	Strong in interaction; access limited by public understanding

Source: Interviews, observation, and unit records, processed by the authors. Note. Interpretations are the authors'.

3.8. Four tentative propositions

The findings suggest four propositions. They come from one site and a small number of informants, and they are offered for testing, not as established results. Each is an interpretation of patterns in the data rather than a causal claim; we state the evidence each rests on and what it cannot show.

Layered responsiveness. Responsiveness in a telephone service that ends in field action is better assessed as two layers, answering and arrival, because users can judge them differently within one experience. C1 rated the first excellent and the second regrettable. Table 1 describes the first layer; Table 2 shows that the second varies. Proposition 1: where a call ends in a field response, answering and arrival should be evaluated separately.

Anticipatory assurance. SERVQUAL places assurance in the interaction, in the knowledge and courtesy of staff (Parasuraman et al., 1988). Here part of the barrier to trust preceded the interaction: C1 feared exposure and C2 feared charges, and both were reassured only after calling. Earlier work points to public understanding and to officer conduct as separate matters (Lahaling et al., 2023; Mbiuwa et al., 2024). The present data add a pre-contact layer, the caller's beliefs about what follows a report. The base is two informants. Proposition 2: assurance and access in police complaint services extend to the pre-contact stage, and callers' expectations of risk and cost shape use as much as officers' behavior during the call.

Accountability asymmetry. Call answering is heavily instrumented: automatic logging, shift recaps, a weekly evaluation, and the expectation that an unanswered call will be questioned. By contrast, K1 said that neither the 10-second nor the 10-minute limit is written in regulation and that both were conveyed as a directive from the National Police Chief (Kapolri); we found no written document setting them out, so this article treats them as

stated working limits, not as formally documented service standards. The regulation does assign Level 1 operators the task of monitoring follow-up and updating report status (Republik Indonesia, 2018), and follow-up reports are compiled in this unit, but we obtained no time-stamped arrival records and do not know whether they exist. The arrival times in this article therefore rest on observation and recollection. If the unit lacks such records, what is measured most closely would differ from what citizens feel most, which is an inference we have not tested. Proposition 3: where instruments and written standards concentrate on call reception, organizational attention may follow what is measured, leaving the quality of follow-up more variable. The present data document the asymmetry in measurement; they do not show that it causes variable follow-up, which would require time-stamped records from several units.

Standard procedures as a competence buffer. In this unit, no operator had formal training, yet citizens found them courteous and the observation showed them working smoothly. The guide, tiered supervision, and routine seem to carry quality in standard situations. O1, however, admitted confusion at the thought of a panicked caller, a situation never faced. Procedural competence appears to be in place, whereas adaptive competence for non-standard calls has not been tested or trained. Call-taking can involve distressing calls and uneven support from supervisors (Willis et al., 2020), which is why the difference matters. Proposition 4: where staff lack vocational training, standard procedures and tiered supervision can sustain quality in standard situations but do not secure it in situations the procedures do not cover.

3.9. Practical implications

For the unit, three records would make follow-up visible: the time a report is received, the time the instruction is passed on, and the time an officer arrives, added to the daily recap and reviewed weekly. A written plan for night follow-up, with a rotating response roster, a map of which sub-district posts back up which areas, and an escalation time limit, would address the delay seen at midnight; whether a dedicated unit is needed should be studied with attention to staffing and budget. Training for all nine operators should include panicked or silent callers and unclear addresses, using role-play and not only online briefings. The opening script could state that the call is free and that the report can be tracked, and confidentiality statements should be accurate and agreed with the legal section. Network outages should be logged with time, duration, and effect on calls, and the broken telephone repaired. For the provincial and national levels, the two time limits could be set down in writing, and the weekly evaluation could include follow-up indicators beside reception indicators.

3.10. Limitations

This is a single-site study with nine informants, four of them citizens, selected purposively. Citizens who reached the service and were willing to talk may have had better experiences than those who failed to connect or were disappointed; none of the latter was interviewed. All informants on the provider side came from the district command, and there were no accounts from sub-district posts or the unit that manages the network, so the assembly and network obstacles are seen from the side of operators, supervisors, and users. The reports citizens described concerned public order, suspected crime, congestion, and an accident; experiences with fires or domestic violence were not captured. Observation lasted

one session and ended in the evening, and only one dispatch could be timed, so midnight and weekend conditions and all arrival times rest on accounts. Time estimates depend on memory. The call records were not analyzed in detail, and their categories are undefined. SERVQUAL was used as an interpretive frame without measuring expectations. Some interviews were held by telephone or messaging, which limits observation of context, and translation may have altered nuance. Finally, the study took place while the service was being reactivated, so the picture is of a particular period.

Conclusions

At this district police command, the response quality of the 110 Police Call Center was stronger at call reception than at field follow-up. Equipment was largely adequate, procedures were clear and closely supervised, calls were answered within seconds, and operators were courteous. The unit's records show far fewer calls left unhandled in 2026 than in 2025, although missed calls remained; these records describe call reception and do not show faster dispatch, arrival, or case resolution. Reported arrival at the scene varied from about 5 minutes to about 30 minutes and was said to lengthen at night, when duty personnel had to be gathered from several units. Assurance was strong in manner but fragile in competence, because no operator had formal training, and in trust before contact, because some citizens hesitated for fear of exposure or call charges. Six obstacles were identified: network disruption, limited training, prank and unclear calls, personnel and distance, equipment upkeep, and public hesitation.

The four propositions concern layered responsiveness, anticipatory assurance, accountability asymmetry, and standard procedures as a competence buffer. They can be tested with time-stamped arrival records, a SERVQUAL survey that separates answering from arrival, and studies of callers who failed to connect. Research in other districts would show whether the pattern repeats.

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Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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