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The Opium Economy and its Dual Role in Afghanistan: An Analysis of Livelihoods, Informal Growth, and Development (2004–2024)

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Abstract. *This research examines the multifaceted role of illicit opium production in Afghanistan's economy from 2004 to 2024, with a focus on its contribution to rural livelihoods, informal economic activity, and long-term development constraints. Through a descriptive-analytical methodology utilizing secondary data from UNODC, the World Bank, and national sources, the study assesses the socio-economic impacts of drug production across three dimensions: household income, GDP contribution via the informal economy, and institutional development. Findings indicate that opium cultivation provided a critical income safety net for rural households, generating 3–5 times higher returns than legal crops and sustaining informal credit systems. Simultaneously, the opium economy constituted 10–15% of national GDP in peak years, functioning as a parallel financial system that facilitated foreign currency inflows but distorted formal markets and discouraged legal investment. However, this short-term economic functionality came at the cost of entrenched corruption, weakened governance, and hindered economic diversification, reinforcing a cycle of dependency and instability. This research directly addresses multiple Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 1.1 (eradicating extreme poverty) by demonstrating opium's role as a rural income safety net; SDG 8.3 (promoting development-oriented policies) by examining informal economic activities; and SDG 16.4 (reducing illicit financial flows) by analyzing how opium revenues fuel shadow economies and undermine institutions. The study concludes that transitioning away from opium reliance requires an integrated policy approach combining agricultural alternatives, rural finance, governance reform, and regional cooperation.*

Keywords: *Afghanistan; Opium Economy; Rural Livelihoods; Informal GDP; Economic Dependency*

1. Introduction

Afghanistan has historically been considered the center of global illicit drug production due to its dominant position in the cultivation and distribution of opium. For nearly two decades, Afghanistan has supplied between 80% to 90% of the world's opium (UNODC, 2023). The illicit opium economy has evolved into a parallel financial system that functions independently from formal state institutions and contributes significantly to household income, rural employment, regional trade, and informal taxation systems. Despite various eradication and anti-narcotics campaigns, opium poppy cultivation has persisted because it provides a critical economic safety net for millions of Afghan households who lack access to credit, irrigation, and markets for legal agricultural products (Mansfield, D, 2016; Pain, 2019).

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Since 2001, national and international actors have attempted to shift Afghanistan away from narcotics dependency by introducing alternative livelihoods, rural development programs, and law enforcement efforts. However, these interventions suffered from fragmented implementation, political interference, and lack of economic alternatives (Byrd, W., & Ward, C, 2004; Felbab-Brown, 2010). Economic fragility, weak institutions, and persistent conflict have made opium production a rational survival strategy rather than a criminal choice. Farmers in regions such as Helmand, Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Farah consistently prefer opium due to its high profitability, resilience to drought, access to informal credit (salaam system), and guaranteed buyers (Mansfield, D, 2021).

The economic role of drug production in Afghanistan is multidimensional. In some years, the value of opium production has reached 10–15% of the national GDP (World Bank, 2021). Beyond cultivation, the narcotics economy creates thousands of jobs in processing, transportation, cross-border smuggling, and trading (UNODC, 2022). Informal taxation by non-state actors also generates significant revenues, enabling the financing of armed groups, which affects political stability and governance (Goodhand, 2020). Thus, the drug economy has implications not only for agriculture and household income but also for national security, regional stability, corruption, and international relations.

Yet, this economic contribution comes with serious trade-offs. The dominance of the opium economy distorts agricultural markets, discourages legal private investment, increases corruption, and undermines formal economic institutions (Chouvy, 2011; SIGAR, 2018). Dependency on drug production traps rural communities in an illicit economic cycle, preventing transition to productive and sustainable legal sectors.

Given the complexity of Afghanistan's political economy, understanding the role of drug production is essential for policymaking, development planning, and designing alternative livelihood strategies. This article therefore aims to analyze the economic contribution of the drug economy, illustrate its socio-economic effects, and discuss potential pathways for transitioning toward a diversified and lawful economy. The study's findings have direct implications for multiple Sustainable Development Goals: SDG 1.1 (eradicating extreme poverty) is relevant because opium provides critical income for vulnerable households; SDG 8.3 (promoting development-oriented policies that support productive activities) is engaged through analysis of informal economic structures; and SDG 16.4 (significantly reducing illicit financial and arms flows) is central to understanding how opium revenues undermine governance and fuel conflict.

2. Research questions

Q1: what is the drug production effect on Afghanistan's rural household income?

Q2: what is the drug production contribution on GDP growth through expansion of informal economy of Afghanistan?

Q3: How the drug production affects long-term institutional development and economic diversification of Afghanistan?

3. Literature Review

3.1. Historical Background of Afghanistan's Drug Economy

The origins of large-scale opium cultivation in Afghanistan can be traced back to the late 1970s, when political instability and Soviet occupation disrupted traditional agricultural markets and state institutions (Goodhand, J, 2005). During the civil war in the 1990s,

warlords used opium revenues as a strategic financial resource (Peters, 2009). By the early 2000s, Afghanistan had become the world's leading exporter of opiates, surpassing Myanmar and Mexico (UNODC, 2002).

Mansfield argues that poppy cultivation expanded as part of a *war economy*, providing liquidity in regions where formal banking and credit systems were absent (Mansfield, D, 2016). The crop's resilience to drought, high market demand, and long shelf life compared to perishable crops contributed to its appeal (Pain, A, 2019). According to Rubin, the opium trade became integrated into local governance systems, forming what he calls "the political economy of disorder" (Rubin, 2006).

3.2. Contribution to Household Income and Rural Livelihoods

Multiple empirical studies confirm that opium provides a significantly higher rate of return compared to legal crops. According to (UNODC, 2022), farmers can earn three to five times more income cultivating opium than wheat or corn. Byrd and Ward describe opium as Afghanistan's "most reliable rural safety net," particularly in provinces suffering from water scarcity and limited access to markets (Byrd, W., & Ward, C, 2004).

The role of opium in the rural credit system is also widely discussed in the literature. The *salaam* credit mechanism—where future opium harvests are pledged for advance payments gives farmers access to capital (Mansfield, D., & Fishstein, P, 2015). No comparable system exists for legal crops, making opium financially superior even before harvesting.

Pain notes that the cash generated from opium flows into rural markets, stimulating consumption of goods and services, and generating multiplier effects (Pain, A, 2019). This aligns with Goodhand's findings that opium sustains rural economies, especially during economic shocks or droughts (Goodhand, J, 2020).

3.3. Macroeconomic Effects and Informal GDP Contribution

Several institutions have attempted to estimate the contribution of opium to Afghanistan's GDP. According to the World Bank, the opium economy has accounted for 10–15% of GDP in certain years a proportion larger than many formal sectors (World Bank, 2021). UNODC (2018) estimated the farm-gate value of opium in 2017 at US$1.4 billion, with the total value of the opiate economy (including processing and trafficking) reaching up to US$6.6 billion.

Chouvy emphasizes that Afghanistan's drug value chain is vertically integrated: production, processing, and smuggling occur inside the country, enabling more economic value to remain domestically. Unlike other countries where drugs are processed abroad, Afghanistan produces intermediates such as morphine base and heroin (Chouvy, P.-A, 2010).

Moreover, the narcotics economy contributes indirectly to trade, foreign currency circulation, and balance of payments, as traffickers exchange profits in neighboring countries' currencies (IMF, 2020).

3.4. Governance, Corruption, and Political Economy

The opium economy is deeply linked to corruption, shadow taxation, and informal governance. Researchers such as Felbab-Brown argue that counter-narcotics campaigns often unintentionally push farmers toward insurgent groups, who offer protection from crop

eradication (Felbab-Brown V. , 2020). UNODC (2023) reports that non-state actors have historically collected taxes of 10% (ushr) on opium harvests.

SIGAR (2018) found that billions of dollars spent on crop eradication and alternative livelihoods delivered limited results, as policies underestimated the political incentives of local elites who benefited from drug revenues. According to Rubin, the opium economy stabilizes local power structures even as it destabilizes the national government (Rubin, 2006).

3.5. Critiques of Counter-Narcotics Policies

The literature is consistent in its conclusion that eradication campaigns have failed. According to Mansfield, forced eradication without providing economic alternatives has pushed farmers into deeper poverty (Mansfield, D, 2021). Felbab-Brown notes that eradication often occurs selectively, protecting politically connected elites while targeting vulnerable farmers (Felbab-Brown, V, 2010).

4. Theoretical Framework

This research is grounded in three economic theories that explain why drug production becomes a major economic activity in Afghanistan.

4.1. Rational Choice Theory

Becker (1968) argues that individuals make decisions by maximizing expected benefits and minimizing costs (Becker, 1968). In the Afghan context, farmers select opium poppy not because of criminal inclination, but because of rational economic calculations: opium provides 3–5 times more income than wheat (UNODC, 2022); opium buyers pay in advance through the salaam system; and opium has a guaranteed market and high liquidity. Thus, cultivating opium becomes a rational economic decision aligned with Becker's theory—farmers choose opium because it maximizes income in an environment of constrained legitimate opportunities.

Table 1. Legal Crop vs. Opium: Rational Economic Decision

Legal Crop (Wheat, Corn)	**Illicit Crop (Opium)**
Low profit margin	3–5× higher income (UNODC, 2022)
High price volatility	Guaranteed buyer and price
No access to credit	Access to advance financing (*salaam*)

4.2. Informal Economy Theory

Portes and Haller define the informal economy as economic activity that operates outside state regulation and taxation (Portes, A., & Haller, W, 2005). Afghanistan's drug economy is a parallel economy with its own financing, supply chain, and taxation by non-state actors. Due to weak state institutions, lack of irrigation, and limited credit markets, opium becomes a functional substitute for the **formal economy**. This theoretical lens explains how drug production becomes institutionalized when formal structures fail to provide essential economic services.

4.3. Dependency Theory (Frank, 1967)

Dependency Theory posits that developing countries become dependent on a single export commodity, preventing diversified economic development (Frank, 1967). Similar to oil dependence in Venezuela or mineral dependence in Congo, Afghanistan becomes dependent on opium as Its main export commodity, a primary source of household income, a major source of foreign currency inflow. Thus, the drug economy creates economic dependency, locking Afghanistan into a cycle of underdevelopment where diversification becomes increasingly difficult.

4.4. Strain Theory (Anomie Theory) – Sociological Economic Lens

Merton states that when legitimate means of achieving economic goals are blocked, individuals turn to illegitimate alternatives (Merton, R. K, 1983). In Afghanistan, there are no banking services in many rural regions, there are no profitable agricultural markets, security and employment are unstable. Thus, opium cultivation becomes an adaptive response to blocked legitimate economic opportunities. This sociological-economic lens complements the other theories by explaining the social mechanisms driving individual participation in the illicit economy.

The theoretical integration can be summarized as follows: Due to low profitability of legal crops (Rational Choice Theory), weak formal institutions (Informal Economy Theory), and dependency on a single export (Dependency Theory), drug production becomes Afghanistan's dominant economic activity. When legal economic opportunities are limited (Strain Theory), farmers make rational income-maximizing decisions by participating in an informal economy, leading to long-term economic dependency on a single illicit commodity.

Table 1. Research related theories

Theory	**Key Author (Original Source)**	**How It Supports This Study**
Rational Choice Theory	Becker (1968)	Farmers choose opium because it maximizes income and minimizes risk in a constrained environment
Informal Economy Theory	Portes & Haller (2005)	Opium functions as a parallel informal economy when the formal economy is weak
Dependency Theory	Frank (1967)	Afghanistan becomes dependent on a single commodity (opium), preventing diversification
Strain/Anomie Theory	Merton (1938)	Lack of legal economic opportunities pushes farmers toward opium as an adaptive response

5. Conceptual Framework

As shown in Figure 1, the conceptual framework illustrates the relationships between drug production and economic outcomes. Drug production (IV) increases household income, provides employment, and circulates cash in the market (MV). These mediating effects lead to changes in GDP, reduced poverty, and increased foreign currency flow (DV). However, it also increases corruption and weakens formal institutions, an important moderating factor to be considered in the discussion.



Figure 1. Research conceptual framework

6. Methodology

This study adopts a descriptive–analytical methodology, using both qualitative interpretation and secondary data from reliable sources. Data on opium cultivation, production, and prices were collected from:

- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2004–2024),
- World Bank Development Indicators,
- IMF country reports,
- Afghanistan National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA).

The analysis focuses on long-term trends in opium cultivation and their estimated contributions to rural incomes and national GDP. Given the limitations of reliable yearly economic data on the illicit sector, the study does not employ formal econometric regression but uses correlation trends and descriptive comparison between opium output and macroeconomic indicators (GDP growth, export structure, and employment).

7. Findings and Conclusion

This research examines the economic influence of opium production in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2024, drawing on longitudinal data from international and national sources. The analysis substantiates that the opium sector has functioned as both a critical economic buffer and a structural impediment to sustainable development.

7.1. The effect of drug production on Afghanistan's rural household income

Throughout the review period, opium cultivation remained the most viable source of agricultural income in many Afghan provinces. Empirical assessments confirm that opium consistently generated significantly higher financial returns than legal staples such as wheat or maize. According to UNODC (2022), the income differential ranged from threefold to

fivefold per hectare. In regions with limited irrigation and market access notably Helmand, Kandahar, and Nangarhar opium accounted for a substantial share of total household earnings, particularly during droughts and economic contractions (World Bank, 2018; Mansfield & Fishstein, 2015). Furthermore, the informal salaam credit system, which provides farmers with advance payments against future opium yields, served as a crucial financial mechanism in the absence of formal banking services (UNODC, 2021). Even following the 2022 cultivation ban, opium retained its economic importance in vulnerable rural communities, underscoring its role as a de facto social safety net in fragile agrarian settings (UNODC, 2023; World Bank, 2023).

As shown in Table 3, opium consistently generated 3.5 to 5 times more income per hectare than wheat, with the highest differential observed in 2017—a peak cultivation year.

Table 3. Comparative Income per Hectare: Opium vs. Wheat (2005–2021)

Year	Opium (USD/Ha)	Wheat (USD/Ha)	Income Ratio (Opium: Wheat)
2005	2,800	800	3.5:1
2009	3,200	850	3.8:1
2013	4,100	900	4.6:1
2017	5,600	1,100	5.1:1
2021	4,800	1,000	4.8:1

Data Sources: UNODC (Various Years), World Bank (2018, 2021), Mansfield & Pain (Field Surveys).

As the table above elaborates, the opium consistently generated 3.5 to 5 times more income per hectare than wheat, with the highest differential observed in 2017—a peak cultivation year. This income advantage explains the persistent preference for opium among farmers facing high economic uncertainty and climatic risk. Even after the Taliban's 2022 ban, opium remained substantially more profitable, though price volatility and eradication pressures reduced the margin slightly in 2023.



Figure 2. Proportion of Rural Household Income from Opium in Key Provinces (2017 Survey Data)

Source: UNODC Afghanistan Survey 2017; World Bank 2018.

In high-intensity cultivation provinces such as Helmand and Kandahar, opium contributed to over 60% of total agricultural income for a majority of rural households. This reliance was not merely seasonal but structural, with many households using opium revenues to cover food security, debt repayment, and healthcare costs. The national average underestimates the critical regional dependencies that have shaped rural livelihoods and local political economies.



Figure 3. Rural Household Income Sources in Opium-Growing Regions (Pie Chart, 2019 Estimate)

Opium and opium-linked activities accounted for approximately 60% of total household income in cultivating regions. This highlights the embedded nature of the opium economy beyond mere cultivation including labor in processing, local trade, and security. The relatively small share of legal crops (20%) underscores the opportunity cost of shifting to licit livelihoods without comparable income replacement.

Beyond direct cultivation revenues, the opium economy supported rural household incomes through several indirect channels:

1. Informal Credit Access (Salaam System):

Advance payments against future opium harvests provided upfront liquidity unavailable for legal crops. This system enabled farmers to cover pre-season expenses such as seeds, fertilizers, and family needs, effectively acting as an informal microfinance institution (Mansfield & Fishstein, 2015).

2. Labor and Employment Multiplier:

Households without land benefited from seasonal employment in harvesting, processing, and guarding opium fields. Daily wages in opium-related labor were 2–3 times higher than those in legal agricultural work (UNODC, 2022).

3. Local Economic Stimulus:

Cash from opium sales circulated in local markets, supporting small shops, transport services, and construction—thereby generating secondary income streams for non-farming rural households (Goodhand, 2020).

4. Risk Management and Debt Repayment:

Opium revenues were frequently used to repay high-interest debts (qarz) and to diversify household income portfolios, including investment in livestock and small trade.

7.2. The contribution of drug production to GDP growth through the expansion of Afghanistan's informal economy

The opium economy constituted a substantial component of Afghanistan's informal economic activity between 2004 and 2024. Estimates indicate that, in peak cultivation years such as 2007, 2014, and 2017, the total value of opiate production and trafficking contributed approximately 10–15% of the country's GDP (World Bank, 2021; UNODC, 2018). At its height in 2017, the farm-level output alone was valued above US$1.4 billion, with the broader illicit opiate economy estimated at US$6–7 billion annually (UNODC, 2018, 2023). This underground sector also facilitated considerable unofficial inflows of foreign currency, estimated at US$1–2 billion per year, which supported informal trade balances and local liquidity, especially in border regions (IMF, 2020). However, because these activities largely bypass state regulation and taxation, they have distorted formal economic indicators, undermined domestic revenue collection, and crowded out productive private investment in legal industries (Chouvy, 2011; SIGAR, 2018).



Figure 4. The contribution of drug production to GDP growth

The opium economy's contribution to GDP fluctuated in response to security conditions, eradication campaigns, and market dynamics. Peaks in 2007, 2014, and 2017 align with periods of reduced state control, high global demand, and favorable growing conditions. The sharp decline in 2022–2023 reflects the Taliban's cultivation ban, though the sector remained economically significant due to stockpiling and price inflation (UNODC, 2023; World Bank, 2023)



Figure 5. Opium Farm-Gate Value vs. Formal Agricultural GDP (2004–2023, USD Billion)

In multiple years, the farm-gate value of opium exceeded 30% of the formal agricultural GDP, underscoring its disproportionate role in the rural economy. This divergence highlights how opium crowded out legal crop investment and created a parallel market system that operated independently of state oversight (World Bank, 2021; UNODC, 2022).

Table 2. Informal vs. Formal Economy Contributors to GDP (2017 Example)

	Opium-Related Inflows (USD Billion)	**Legal Exports (USD Billion)**
Average	1.5 – 2.0	0.8 – 1.2
Peak (2017)	~2.4	~1.1
Low (2023)	~0.9	~0.7

Source: *Adapted from World Bank (2021) and UNODC (2018)*

Opium-related activities generated more foreign currency than all legal exports combined in most years between 2004 and 2023. These inflows stabilized local currencies in provinces like Helmand and Kandahar and financed informal import networks, thereby integrating Afghanistan's shadow economy with regional markets in Iran, Pakistan, and Central Asia (IMF, 2020; UNODC, 2022).

The opium economy contributed to GDP growth through several indirect channels:

1. **Employment Multiplier:**

Beyond cultivation, the sector created jobs in processing, security, logistics, and money laundering. UNODC (2022) estimated that 10–15% of Afghanistan's labor force participated in opium-related activities during peak years.

2. **Informal Credit and Investment:**

The salaam system injected liquidity into rural economies, enabling local consumption and small-scale investment in shops, transport, and housing. This stimulated informal service sectors that are not captured in national accounts (Mansfield, 2021).

3. Shadow Fiscal Flows:

Non-state actors collected informal taxes on opium production, which were then redistributed through local procurement, salaries, and patronage networks—effectively creating a parallel fiscal system (Goodhand, 2020).

7.3. Drug production effects on long-term institutional development and economic diversification in Afghanistan

The entrenched opium economy has exerted a corrosive influence on institutional integrity and economic diversification over the past two decades. Illicit opium revenues have been systematically harnessed by non-state actors—including insurgent groups—through informal taxation mechanisms such as *ushr*, generating an estimated US$100–400 million annually in off-budget financing (UNODC, 2023; Felbab-Brown, 2020). This has not only fueled conflict but also fostered systemic corruption and state weakening, as formal institutions compete with parallel governance structures. Economically, Afghanistan's deep reliance on opium has mirrored a mono-export dependency syndrome, hindering investment in alternative sectors and perpetuating a rent-seeking political economy (Frank, 1967; Rubin, 2006). Despite significant international expenditure on counter-narcotics and alternative livelihoods—exceeding US$9 billion between 2002 and 2021—sustainable diversification has remained elusive due to fragmented implementation, elite capture, and inadequate complementary reforms in rural finance and infrastructure (SIGAR, 2021; Mansfield, 2021).

7.4. Overall Conclusion

Between 2004 and 2024, Afghanistan's opium economy provided critical, though precarious, livelihoods and liquidity in the face of institutional fragility and conflict. However, its dominance has simultaneously reinforced informality, undermined governance, and obstructed structural economic transformation. Moving forward, effective policy must transcend narrowly focused eradication and embrace integrated development strategies that address the underlying drivers of opium dependence: lack of rural finance, weak market linkages, insecurity, and governance deficits. Only through such a holistic approach can Afghanistan transition toward a more resilient and lawful economic future.

8. Discussion

The findings presented above illuminate the complex and persistent role of opium in Afghanistan's political economy. This discussion interprets these results through relevant theoretical lenses and considers their implications for policy and future research. To enhance readability and align with the three research questions, this section is organized under corresponding subheadings.

8.1. Research Question 1: Household Income Effects

The sustained preference for opium cultivation among Afghan farmers aligns closely with Rational Choice Theory (Becker, 1968). In an environment characterized by limited access to formal credit, volatile crop prices, and recurrent climatic shocks, opium represents a risk-mitigating livelihood strategy. For instance, during the severe droughts of 2011 and 2018, opium's drought tolerance provided income stability where legal crops failed (Pain, 2019). The salaam system further reduces farmers' vulnerability by offering upfront

liquidity—a financial service largely absents in the formal sector. Thus, opium cultivation is less an expression of criminality than a rational economic response to systemic constraints. This finding directly addresses SDG 1.1 (eradicating extreme poverty), as opium functions as a poverty prevention mechanism in the absence of formal safety nets.

8.2. Research Question 2: GDP and Informal Economy Contributions

The durability and scale of Afghanistan's opium sector reflect its function as a parallel economic system, consistent with Informal Economy Theory (Portes & Haller, 2005). In the absence of effective state provision of security, credit, and market infrastructure, the opium economy has generated its own governance and financial mechanisms. This informal system has filled critical gaps, particularly in conflict-affected regions, but at the cost of undermining state-building and perpetuating institutional hybridity. As noted by Rubin (2006), opium revenues have often stabilized local power structures while destabilizing the central state, creating a paradox of local functionality amid national fragility. This analysis engages with SDG 8.3 (promoting development-oriented policies), highlighting the need to understand informal economic dynamics when designing formal sector interventions.

8.3. Research Question 3: Institutional Development and Diversification

Afghanistan's experience exemplifies a classic dependency trap (Frank, 1967), wherein the economy becomes reliant on a single illicit commodity. Opium has accounted for a dominant share of export value, crowding out incentives for investment in legal alternatives. This dependency is reinforced by a rentier political economy in which elites—both within and outside the state—benefit from the status quo and resist diversification efforts (Goodhand, 2020). International programs aimed at promoting alternative livelihoods have often faltered due to their project-based, short-term nature, which fails to address deeper structural barriers such as land tenure insecurity, lack of market access, and corruption (Mansfield, 2021). These findings directly relate to SDG 16.4 (reducing illicit financial flows) and SDG 16.5 (substantially reducing corruption and bribery).

8.4. Conflict Finance and the Governance-Security Nexus

A critical dimension of Afghanistan's opium economy is its symbiotic relationship with conflict. Non-state armed groups have derived substantial revenue from taxing opium production and trade, which in turn funds insurgent activities and weakens state authority (Felbab-Brown, 2020). This creates a vicious cycle: instability drives farmers toward opium for survival, and opium revenues finance further instability. Counter-narcotics measures that focus solely on eradication—without providing protections or alternatives—can exacerbate this cycle by alienating rural communities and strengthening armed groups (Byrd & Ward, 2004).

8.5. Policy Implications: Toward an Integrated Transition Framework

The historical failure of fragmented interventions suggests that a comprehensive, multi-sectoral approach is necessary to reduce opium dependence. Drawing on the findings, the following actionable recommendations are proposed for different stakeholder groups:

For Government Actors:

- Establish rural financial institutions that provide micro-credit comparable to the salaam system's accessibility
- Invest in water management infrastructure (irrigation, dams) to reduce opium's drought-resistance advantage
- Implement transparent governance mechanisms to reduce corruption in agricultural and development programs
- Create value chains for high-value legal crops with guaranteed procurement mechanisms

For International Donors:

- Shift from short-term, project-based funding to long-term (10–15 year) development commitments
- Condition assistance on governance reforms while providing technical support for implementation
- Fund research and development for drought-resistant, high-value legal crops suitable for Afghan conditions
- Support regional trade agreements that create legal export markets for Afghan agricultural products

For NGOs and Civil Society:

- Develop community-based alternative livelihood programs that involve farmers in design and implementation
- Provide legal literacy and rights awareness to help farmers navigate formal systems
- Monitor and report corruption in counter-narcotics and development programs
- Facilitate farmer cooperatives to improve bargaining power in legal markets

For Regional Cooperation:

- Establish bilateral and multilateral agreements for intelligence sharing on trafficking networks
- Create legal cross-border trade mechanisms that reduce the comparative advantage of smuggling
- Harmonize customs and border management to disrupt illicit financial flows (SDG 16.4)

9. Research Limitations and Future Directions

This study relies on macro-level data, which may not fully capture local variations in the political economy of opium. Future research could employ mixed-method designs, combining household surveys, focus groups, and ethnographic methods to explore micro-level decision-making and adaptation strategies. Comparative studies with other drug producing regions such as Colombia or Myanmar could also yield valuable insights into pathways for managing illicit crop transitions in post-conflict settings. Additionally, research is needed on the effectiveness of specific alternative livelihood interventions and on mechanisms to strengthen formal institutions in ways that address the root causes of opium dependence identified in this study.

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